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JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO COMPREHENSIVELY 
PLANNED NO-GROWTH PROVISIONS: 
RAMAPO, PETALUMA, AND BEYOND 
By Robert C. Kellner* 
As population, pollution, and the problems of progress increase, 
many citizens of suburban and rural municipalities see their present 
way of life endangered. In response to this perceived threat they 
have turned to zoning or other restrictive measures to limit or pro-
hibit growth and thus preserve the character of their communities. 
Unfortunately, there may be serious side effects to this cure. 
Exclusionary zoning ordinances are not a new phenomenon. For 
many years cities and towns utilized them with little or no judicial 
interference. Recently, however, some courts have shown an unwill-
ingness to routinely sustain local zoning decisions in the face of 
constitutional challenges. As this trend continues, future restric-
tions are likely to move beyond simple zoning and adopt a different 
form. Instead of relying on minimum lot size, floor space, or density 
requirements, municipalities wanting to stop population expansion 
will enact a variety of "no-growth" provisions l tied to comprehen-
sive planning programs. The major concern of this article is to ex-
amine these "no-growth" provisions and the possible responses to 
them by the judiciary. 
The first section briefly sets out the constitutional principles upon 
which challenges to the provision will most likely be based. As these 
issues have been analyzed in detail by other articles, they are men-
tioned here only to help construct the framework. In response to a 
challenge, the zoning authority will almost undoubtedly have to 
provide a justifying rationale. Section II will set out the most fre-
quently used "interests" advanced by cities and towns. Included 
therein will necessarily be a short discussion of many exclusionary 
techniques. Section III examines the judiciary's response to the 
strategies adopted by two municipalities to severely limit growth in 
their respective communities. Although the Supreme Court has long 
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refrained from deciding the merits of zOrWng cases, several of its 
recent opinions may give some insight into the Court's probable 
response to no-growth. In addition, the final section will make rec-
ommendations for a solution which will attempt to strike a balance 
between the need for communities to assume their fair share of the 
burdens of growth and the need for protecting the natural beauty 
and character of the environment to the fullest extent possible. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL BASES OF CHALLENGES TO NO-GROWTH 
PROVISIONS 
Almost all legal attacks upon the enactments of local zoning 
authorities have been based upon one of three constitutional 
theories-the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, 
or the right to travel. The use of each has distinct advantages and 
disadvantages depending upon the peculiarities of the specific 
fact situations involved in the zoning challenge. 
Zoning regulations are generally presumed to be valid2 and any 
plaintiff trying to overturn them has a difficult burden. The early 
challenges were almost exclusively brought by landowners claiming 
that the zoning ordinance unconstitutionally deprived them of their 
. property-or at least the free enjoyment or full economic potential 
thereof-without due process of law. At least in challenges before 
the United States Supreme Court, the chances of setting such ordi-
nances aside on these grounds are very slim.3 
State courts also have been reluctant to grant relief in this area 
unless the plaintiff can show that the "taking" amounts to a com-
plete restriction on all beneficial uses of the property. Failing this, 
the plaintiff faces the nearly impossible burden of showing that the 
enactment is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable" and is therefore 
an abuse of the police power. Moreover, even if the Due Process 
Clause were a more viable weapon to attack no-growth enactments, 
only individual landowners, and not those denied access to the com-
munity, would be able to sue.4 
The interests of those excluded by the operation of a no-growth 
provision would seem better suited to the protection offered by the 
Equal Protection Clause.5 The "new equal protection" test utilizes 
a two-tier standard.6 lfthe challenged law invidiously discriminates 
against a suspect classification7 or if it hinders the enjoyment of a 
fundamental right,8 that enactment must meet the strict scrutiny 
of the "compelling interest" test. Otherwise, the court will demand 
only that there be a "rational basis" behind it. In the vast majority 
of cases, the success or failure of the suit is determined by which 
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standard the court sees fit to employ. Thus, plaintiffs will try to 
convince the court that the enactment includes them within a sus-
pect classification or impinges upon a fundamental right. 
Both the "compelling interest" and "rational basis" standards 
focus upon the interests of the municipality in the ordinance or by-
law. Emphasizing the reasons behind the plan is a constructive 
approach. However, there are also major difficulties with using the 
equal protection doctrine. The Supreme Court has had little prob-
lem with situations in which it could ascertain an intent to discrimi-
nate by race; and for a while it seemed that the Court might extend 
protection against snob zoning to the indigent; but it is now unlikely 
that this will develop in the near future. 8 At the present time, plain-
tiffs would find it difficult to come up with the recognized classifica-
tion necessary to mount a successful Equal Protection challenge. 
Nor does it seem likely that the Court will expand the list of funda-
mental rights for equal protection purposes. 10 If and when municipal 
boundaries are de-emphasized and zoning is done on a regional 
basis, the Equal Protection Clause may become a much more potent 
weapon. But until then, only an activist court is likely to use it to 
strike down no-growth provisions. II 
Another approach is to claim the ordinance impinges upon plain-
tiff's rights of association and travel, both of which are considered 
"fundamental" by the Supreme Court. Thus, their infringement 
can be justified only upon a showing of a compelling governmental 
interest, a test rarely met. In 1941, the United States Supreme 
Court, in Edwards v. California,12 forcefully declared that no state 
may impose a penalty or set unjustified restrictions upon the migra-
tion of residents into a state. It is also clear that this protection 
extends to intrastate as well as interstate travel. 13 The right to travel 
and its application to exclusionary zoning has been extensively ex-
amined elsewherel4 and will be analyzed below in connection with 
Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. Petaluma. 15 
It will suffice to note here that application of the "right to travel" 
concept has great potential for use against "no-growth" provisions, 
especially since the concept is well-suited to a balancing test be-
tween the interests of the municipality on one hand and those of 
excluded persons and other potential plaintiffs on the other. ls.1 
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR EXCLUSIONARY DEVICES OFFERED BY 
MUNICIPALITIES 
Courts have often proclaimed that they will not act as a super 
zoning authority and therefore will overturn only flagrant abuses of 
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power. Where a plaintiff has presented a claim of infringement upon 
a fundamental right, however, the municipality will have to put 
forth its reasons to legitimatize the exclusion. 
In defending against an attack based upon one of the above theo-
ries, sometimes it is not sufficient for the defendant to show that the 
ordinance furthers even a substantial governmental interest. In 
pursuing that important interest, it cannot choose means that un-
necessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity. If 
there are other reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser 
burden on constitutionally protected rights, a governmental body 
may not choose the path of greater interference. "If it acts at all; 
it must choose less drastic means."18 The inquiry into the import-
ance of the governmental interest is well highlighted in many situa-
tions. The following subsections discuss a number of justifications 
that have been offered by defendant municipalities in support of 
various exclusionary devices. 
A. Preservation of a Town's Character. 
One of the most common justifications advanced by a zoning 
authority is that it is merely trying to protect the town's homogene-
ity and character in accordance with the perceived needs of the 
community. This often seems little more than another means of 
arguing that an ordinance should be granted a great presumption 
of validity. There are a number of cases in which a landowner, 
wishing to use his land for commercial purposes, has challenged 
action which zoned the whole community as residential. To uphold 
such an ordinance many variations of this theory have been em-
ployed. In City of Richlawn v. McMakin,17 the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals found that because an overwhelming majority of the town's 
residents had left the noise and pollution of the big city and desired 
to keep their community quiet, safe, and residential, a sufficient 
interest to uphold the ordinance had been demonstrated. Some 
courts have held that a township could bar all commercial uses, so 
long as they were available nearby, if such action was needed to 
preserve the town's character. 18 
However, the preceding cases dealt with ordinances restricting 
the use to which a landowner could put his land. No-growth provi-
sions, by comparison, should be viewed from a very different 
perspective-since they not only regulate land use but bar people 
as well. 19 The "character of a town" justification avoids the question 
of balancing altogether, and focuses merely on the desires of a given 
municipality as articulated by its zoning board. The effects upon 
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other communities and on the general public are largely ignored. 
The desire to preserve its character should be considered insuffi-
cient, standing alone, to justify a no-growth provision. 
B. Preservation of Land Values 
In addition to citing preservation of its character, a city or town 
may defend its restrictive zoning enactment with the argument 
that it is merely maintaining land values.20 The residents of a town 
may regard the preservation of their property values as the most 
important function of their elected officials. Increased population 
or development is often seen by them as a threat to the exclusivity 
or the desirability of their town as a place to live, and hence de-
structive to the prices which their properties will command. 
It is an accepted principle that a municipality may prohibit a 
landowner from utilizing his land in the most profitable manner. 21 
The law has recognized situations in which the greater good of the 
community has outweighed the cries of diminution of property 
value. A current example of this is the furor which often surrounds 
the location of a "halfway house" in a community.22 Just as the 
interests of the town as a whole may be advanced to the detriment 
of an individual landowner, the interests of the larger regional com-
munity should be preferred over the interests of a single town. More-
over, a reduction in a town's land values is often a temporary and 
highly subjective determination. This is not to imply that the dimi-
nution of property values should not be considered in weighing the 
validity of zoning ordinances but rather that such considerations 
should not be the sole criteria for evaluation. This is particularly 
true of no-growth plans which should be justified in terms of the 
general welfare of the community at large. 
C. Aesthetic Considerations 
The "town character" and "land value" interests are often ad-
vanced in conjunction with a third: preservation of the natural 
beauty of the surroundings.23 Many state statutes authorizing locali-
ties to enact zoning laws are explicitly designed, among other pur-
poses, " ... to conserve the value of land and buildings; ... and 
to preserve and increase its [the municipality's] amenities."24 Al-
though all zoning enactments can be said, in a sense, to promote the 
attractiveness of the community,25 aesthetics are considered here 
only when specifically advanced as a governmental interest. A ma-
jority of jurisdictions hold that aesthetics are insufficient to justify 
a zoning prohibition, but this conclusion is undergoing some change 
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in the direction of recognizing aesthetics as an important govern-
mental "interest."28 However, it is still the generally accepted view 
that a municipality must show that the challenged zoning ordi-
nance serves the public health, safety, or welfare, and may not rely 
solely on general aesthetics. 27 Cases so holding have invalidated 
aesthetically motivated bans on everything from gas stations,28 
front-yard fences,29 and billboards,30 to minimum lot sizes.3! The 
rationales of these decisions range from a belief that the police 
power must be based only upon necessities32 to a simplistic state-
ment that aesthetic considerations may vary greatly with taste 
and culture, defy universal definition, and are therefore inappro-
priate objectives of police power regulation. 33 
The newer trend, which has been accepted primarily in Wisconsin 
and New York, argues that aesthetic considerations are not a mere 
luxury, but rather an integral part of the concept of general wel-
fare,34 and are sufficient to uphold a restrictive zoning ordinance. A 
nation's beautiful places are among its natural resources. 35 Between 
these two positions is the belief that aesthetic considerations are 
merely one factor to be weighed in the decision to allow a town to 
opt for a no-growth policy. Preserving the aesthetic appeal of a 
particular community benefits not only that community, but also 
the surrounding region. 
D. Public Health and Municipal Services 
The next group of "interests" relied on to validate "no-growth" 
legislation focuses upon the strain that population growth would 
put on a local government's ability to render services. These serv-
ices are broken up into two main groups: those which relate to the 
public health and safety, such as water supply, sewers, garbage 
collection, police, and fire protection; and those pertaining to other 
municipal responsibilities like schools, transportation, and roads. 
Both groups include those functions which are commonly thought 
of as being inherently under local control. 
In the majority of cases to date, if the basis behind zoning laws 
were examined at all, all the town need do to pass judicial scrutiny 
was allege that the particular exclusion was necessary to the public 
health, safety or welfare. In Josephs v. Town Board of Clarkstown,38 
a typical case, the New York Supreme Court (Rockland County) 
held that the duty of a municipality to supply necessary facilities 
as its population expands will not bar it from its normal right to 
regulate and control population density to avoid unnecessary hard-
ships to taxpayers and further the public welfare. Applying this 
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rationale, the court upheld as reasonable and valid an ordinance 
which required the town to find, before any building permit would 
be granted, that existing facilities were adequate to provide for the 
needs of present and future residents and that the health, safety 
and welfare of the town would not be adversely affected. Most 
courts have recognized that alleviating the tax burden and reduc-
ing harmful school congestion are permissible zoning purposes, if 
done reasonably and in furtherance of a comprehensive plan.37 
While this position is followed in the great majority of jurisdic-
tions, a new trend is developing especially with regard to zoning 
enactments explicitly prohibiting or severely limiting growth. It 
has been held that the mere allegation that services would be over-
burdened is insufficient to uphold the ordinance. The defendant 
municipality will be forced to present evidence, including expert 
witnesses, to support its claims.38 Some courts go even further. In 
Lakeland Bluff Inc. v. County of Will,39 while striking down an 
ordinance prohibiting trailer parks, the Illinois Appellate Court 
stated that "[the fact that] development would possibly cause an 
increase in local government costs for schools, roads, and other facil-
ities . . . could not be a justifiable basis for rejecting an otherwise 
appropriate use of plaintiff's property."40 While the regulation of 
municipal expenditures is one of the major responsibilities of local 
governments, there must be some limit to a municipality's power to 
take action justified only by its fiscal duties. Admittedly, if a town 
limits future development to commercial or industrial enterprises, 
there will be more tax money without the addition of any school 
children, and thus the fiscal position of the school board will be 
strengthened; but only at the cost of circumventing the "raison 
d' etre" of the schools. 41 This reasoning is applicable to other services 
besides schools, reinforcing the viewpoint that fiscal zoning per se 
is an impermissible purpose for zoning enactments.42 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has been in the forefront of the 
trend against exclusionary zoning ordinances.43 It has dealt with the 
claim of overburdening of municipal facilities by dismissing the 
town's argument as makeweight. As the reasoning of its cases makes 
clear, a town with only one bus cannot justify its exclusionary zon-
ing scheme by refusing to buy a second bus. Nor maya town point 
to a road network suitable only for the present population; new 
roads must be built to accommodate new people.44 Progress means 
sewers must be enlarged, new schools must be built, and facilities 
expanded.45 "Zoning provisions may not be used ... to avoid the 
increased responsibilities and economic burdens which time and 
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natural growth invariably bring."48 
The judicial trend opposing the "fiscal zoning" rationale is based 
on the assumption that it is physically and economically possible 
for a town to expand its facilities. Where this is shown to be impossi-
ble, such "fiscal" justifications for a zoning ordinance may be en-
tirely reasonable and proper, subject only to the qualification that 
a less-drastic alternative may be feasible. However, the vast major-
ity of claims that growth would overburden municipal facilities oc-
curs in situations where the defendant municipality is physically 
able to meet the demands of growth. 
E. Temporary Moratorium 
For reasons closely related to the theory that a no-growth provi-
sion is justified by the inability to expand municipal services, a 
town may initiate a temporary moratorium on all building to allow 
for emergency planning to prevent the destruction of the town by 
rapid, uncontrolled growth. 47 A dramatic example of this "interest" 
occurred in the recent case of Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town 
of Sanbornton.48 
Sanbornton has a permanent population of about 1000 persons 
occupying 330 homes. The plaintiff developer planned to build more 
than 500 seasonal family units arranged in clusters to be occupied 
almost exclusively as second homes. In response, the town zoning 
board dramatically enlarged the minimum lot size in the districts 
in which all of plaintiff's 510 acres were situated from approxi-
mately % acre to three and six acre lots. In ruling on the plaintiff's 
challenge to this zoning amendment, the New Hampshire Federal 
District Court upheld both the three and the six acre requirements. 49 
Citing the town planning board's determination that the soil and 
topographical conditions posed severe problems for sewerage dis-
posal, drainage and erosion, the three acre requirement was justified 
on public health grounds. The six acre requirement was found rea-
sonably related to the promotion of the general welfare in light of 
the likely pollution oflakes, interference with smelt spawning, and 
traffic problems which would be caused by the proposed develop-
ment. 
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed, holding that the District 
Court opinion could not be deemed clearly erroneous.50 In so ruling, 
the court recognized 
. . . as within the general welfare, concerns relating to the construction 
and integration of hundreds of new homes which would have an irrever-
sible effect on the area's ecological balance, destroy scenic values, de-
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crease open space, significantly change the rural character of this small 
town, pose substantial burdens on the town for police, fire, sewer and 
road service ... 51 
The potentially broad impact of this holdng was extremely qualified 
however. The court read the ordinance as an effort to provide for 
orderly and logical growth of the unspoiled areas of the town in order 
to combat fears of premature or unwise development. Acknowledg-
ing that the town may have been motivated by the desire to exclude 
outsiders altogether-which would have been impermissible - the 
court, nevertheless, gave the municipality the benefit of the doubt 
in order to let it plan for the future. Moreover, Sanbornton was 
clearly forewarned that it must quickly begin that planning in a 
concrete fashion since the court explicitly viewed the drastic in-
creases in minimum lot size as only a temporary solution.52 
F. Comprehensive Planning 
The language of a majority of state zoning enabling acts, from 
which municipalities derive their authority to enact and enforce 
zoning laws, is similar to that of § 3 of the Standard State Zoning 
Enabling Act: "zoning regulations shall be made in accordance with 
a comprehensive plan."53 Thus, as traditional municipal "interests" 
are either closely examined or held insufficient to support restrictive 
zoning laws, it is likely that zoning authorities will come more and 
more to depend upon their planning powers for justification. This 
should not imply, however, that all a city or town need do to defeat 
a challenge to a zoning ordinance is to come into court and utter the 
magic words, "comprehensive plan." While producing a plan does 
imply that the zoning board has acted pursuant to a valid purpose 
and in a responsible and reasonable manner, these implications can 
be challenged. 
If challenged, it is reasonable to require the defendant municipal-
ity to prove that the comprehensive plan was based upon a detailed 
strategy drawn up by professional planners, and that the zoning 
ordinance in question is reasonably calculated to fulfill the plan's 
goals. In Albrecht Realty Co. v. Township of New Castle,54 the New 
York Supreme Court (Westchester County) struck down the defen-
dant township's amendment to its zoning law which severely lim-
ited the rate of building in the township. The court first noted that 
nothing in the New York Town Laws gives a town the power to 
regulate the rate of its growth. 55 Furthermore, the law positively 
requires that zoning regulations be made "in accordance with a 
comprehensive plan ... to facilitate the adequate provision of ... 
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schools. . and other public requirements."sa There was no sugges-
tion in the case that the ordinance under attack had been drawn in 
accordance with any pbm to facilitate the adequate provision of 
schools, much less any comprehensive plan. All of the evidence 
indicated that the ordinance was enacted solely to relieve a certain 
school district of the necessity to provide additional school facilities. 
The plaintiff may also challenge a zoning ordinance as not in 
accordance with a comprehensive plan if he can show that the pur-
pose of the plan is to unreasonably resist increased population and 
the concurrent increased demand for governmental services. A com-
prehensive plan may be used to allow a community to plan for, but 
not to deny, the future. 57 In Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township 
of Madison,58 the town's plan stressed orderly gfowth and preserva-
tion of open space in contrast to explosive growth on a patchwork 
basis. Plaintiffs were able to show, however, that three of the plan-
ning firm's specific recommendations for growth had not been 
adopted, while the exclusionary limitations were. While the facts of 
this case are not typical,58 the use of expert planning testimony and 
the careful scrutiny given to the plan are worth noting. 
Courts should make every effort to preserve a comprehensive plan 
when it is developed in good faith and is reasonable as a whole with 
regard to the needs ofthe local and general communities.ao In exam-
ining it, all of the other "interests" discussed above should be taken 
into account. By putting the focus clearly on a master plan the court 
does not have to deal with a zoning ordinance in isolation but can 
make an interpretation, confident that it comprehends it in the 
context of the totality of the municipality's efforts. For this reason 
alone, shifting the "battle" to examination of a comprehensive plan 
is beneficial. 
III. NO-GROWTH PROVISIONS AND THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 
The judicial trend toward emphasizing the master plan, and ex-
aming the "lesser interests" through it, does not change the central 
question that underlies all exclusionary zoning devices: to what de-
gree can a community prohibit or severely limit population growth? 
Two recent cases, each arising in a densely populated state, have 
addressed this query. 
A. Golden v. Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo 
In Golden v. Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo,81 after the 
plaintiffs had submitted subdivision plans for their tract of land, 
which was zoned "rural residential", the town amended its ordi-
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nances to require that any residential developer obtain a special 
permit from the town board prior to subdivision development. In 
order to eliminate premature subdivision and urban sprawl the 
amendments set out a plan tying issuance of the special permit to 
the availability of proposed municipal services such as sewers, 
parks, schools, roads, and fire protection. To be approved, a site was 
required to collect a specified number of development points com-
puted upon a sliding scale of values. The point system was closely 
tied to the town's 18 year capital improvements plan under which, 
at the end of the period, all of the town's land would be available 
for development. Thus unless the developer was able to provide such 
services at his own expense, he would be forced to wait for a period 
of up to 18 years. 
Plaintiffs brought suit in the New York Supreme Court (Rockland 
County) to invalidate these requirements on the grounds that they 
exceeded the authority delegated to the town by the state zoning 
enabling act, particularly New York Town Law §§ 261 and 263, and 
that the ordinance operated to destroy the value and marketability 
of their premises, thus constituting an unconstitutional "taking" of 
their property. 
The trial court rejected these arguments and upheld the ordi-
nance. Appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion,82 which reversed and granted summary judgment for the plain-
tiffs, holding that the primary purpose of the ordinance was to con-
trol or regulate population growth within the town and as such was 
not within the authorized objectives of New York's zoning enabling 
legislation. In the course of their opinions, the Appellate Division 
justices discussed many of the relevant legal, economic, and social 
considera tions of the case and noted that other constitutional 
grounds were available.83 The New York Court of Appeals reversed 
by a 5-2 vote and upheld Ramapo's plan. Unfortunately, the major-
ity in Golden regarded its holding as inevitable and patterned its 
opinion accordingly. 
In making its first assumption, the Court of Appeals went a long 
way towards reaching its decision to uphold Ramapo's permit plan. 
Noting that plaintiff did not contest the town's allegation that pres-
ent facilities were inadequate to service increasing demands, the 
majority concluded that". . . we must assume, therefore, that the 
proposed amendments, both as to their nature and extent, reflect 
legitimate community needs and are not veiled efforts at exclu-
sion"84 - thus distinguishing the Pennsylvania cases previously dis-
cussed in this article. 85 This premise, which is by no means as axio-
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matic as is implied, put the case in the posture of an emergency 
situation in which a beleaguered town must stop population growth 
or else face drastic consequences. Furthermore, the majority explic-
itly found that the defendant's purpose was "undisputably lauda-
tory,"88 and decided that the method chosen to further that purpose 
was reasonable. In the court's view, the effect of these integrated 
efforts in land-use planning and development was to provide for 
orderly growth through a developmental policy based upon the 
progressing availability of adequate services and facilities. More-
over, any resulting "restraint upon property use [was] to be of a 
temporary nature."87 
Only after these beneficial purposes and effects are set out, does 
the court ask if the manner in which those ends are to be achieved 
is valid. The Appellate Division had held that the primary purpose 
of the town's plan was to regulate population growth, and was, 
therefore, not within the authorized objectives of the zoning ena-
bling legislation. By contrast, a majority of the Court of Appeals 
held that although there was no specific authorization for the "se-
quential" and "timing" controls, they must be measured against 
the statutory scheme taken as a whole to further a viable policy of 
land use and planning. Looking at §§ 261 and 263 of the New York 
Town Law which set out the delegated powers and the permissible 
purposes of zoning, the majority found that the amendments were 
a valid exercise of proper zoning techniques. The court held that the 
Planning Board had the power to regulate and control the density 
of population-and therefore the demand for municipal services-
for the enumerated purposes of preventing "the undue concentra-
tion of population" and providing for adequate "transportation, 
schools, water, and other public requirements."88 The power to "re-
strict and regulate" gives the town board the power to direct the 
growth of population and to determine the lines along which local 
development will proceed, so long as it acts in furtherance of the 
statutory purposes under the auspices of a comprehensive plan. 
The Court cited the subdivision control statutes, New York Town 
Law §§ 276 and 277, as reflecting a legislative judgment that rural 
development shall be tied to the provision of essential facilities. 
These sections were read as complementing other land use restric-
tions which, when taken together, seek to implement a broader, 
comprehensive plan for community development. In response to 
plaintiff's argument that the effect of the timing controls amounted 
to an unauthorized blanket interdiction against subdivision, the 
court held that the essence of the defendant's action was to 
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condition subdivision rights- not deny them. The fact that it was 
the town itself, and not the developer (as usually is the case in 
subdivision control controversies), which was required to make the 
improvements, does not change the analysis. The argument ad-
vanced in the lower court8D that a town might delay improv~ments, 
and thus, by failing to adhere to its own schedule, place further 
impediments on the "patient owner" was summarily dismissed in 
a footnote,1° The town's good faith and its adherence to the planned 
program must be assumed; the owner will be able to come into court 
only if and when the town defaults on its assumed obligations. 
Current zoning enabling legislation places the regulation of land 
use and development in the hands of local governments. Even the 
majority opinion in Golden conceded that community autonomy in 
this area is an antiquated notion which hinders regional and state-
wide efforts to tackle many serious contemporary problems and ig-
nores issues of broader public interest.71 Some states have begun to 
act on this problem.72 While New York provides for regional plan-
ning,73 the resulting planning recommendations are not binding, 
and the power to zone remains totally in the hands of cities and 
towns. The Golden majority noted the effects upon the rights of 
long-term residents, the restrictions on free mobility, and the past 
history of municipalities' utilization of exclusionary zoning devices 
to avoid growth under the guise of planning, but found that these 
are outweighed by "accumulated evidence, scientific and social, 
pointing circumspectly at the hazards of undirected growth."74 
Since a single municipality cannot solve these problems alone and 
the legislature has yet to act, the Golden court saw no alternative 
but to adhere to the plain statutory delegation as it now stands, and 
ultimately held that phased growth is well within the ambit of exist-
ing zoning enabling legislation. Several broad outlines for develop-
ment at a regional level, which were put forth by various groups, 
were noted in the majority's opinion,75 but none of them have yet 
been enacted by the legislature. While regional planning may be a 
better solution, a town should not have to wait until the efforts of 
groups such as the State Office of Planning Coordination or the 
American Law Institute bear fruit.78 The Court concluded that land 
use planning is an area in which the judiciary should acknowledge 
its lack of expertise and exercise self-restraint. The zoning author-
ity's decisions should be given the usual presumption of validity, 
and the burden of proving their invalidity falls upon the challenger. 
The court next proceeded to examine plaintiff's claim that the 
town had gone further than providing reasonable restrictions on 
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development to advance the public welfare, and had, in effect, 
sought to avoid the responsibilities of natural growth. The court 
distinguished the line of Pennsylvania cases which held that "zon-
ing is a means by which a governmental body can plan for the 
future-it may not be used as a means to deny the future."77 Noting 
that all zoning regulations by their very nature limit, to some ex-
tent, the forces of natural growth, the Golden court concluded that 
those regulations which are necessary to promote the ultimate good 
of the municipality and are reasonable must be sustained. 
On a case-by-case basis, the line between permissible and imper-
missible restrictions ultimately depends upon a court's perception 
of the purpose of the restrictions and their effect on the community 
and the general public interest. Presuming Ramapo's good faith, the 
Golden majority found that the effect of the subdivision control 
restriction was to provide a "balanced, cohesive community dedi-
cated to efficient utilization of land" in conformance with its com-
prehensive plan and "the long-range maximization of population 
density consistent with orderly growth."78 As the exclusion was tem-
porary,79 and for "noble purposes", the existence of less restrictive 
alternatives did not persuade the court to substitute its judgment 
for that of the town in deciding how best to proceed "to obviate the 
blighted aftermath which the initial failure to provide needed facili-
ties so often brings. "80 
The dissent disagreed with almost every conclusion drawn in the 
majority opinion. In the area of land use, a municipality only has 
powers which are expressly delegated or necessarily implied. The 
local zoning boards are given the authority to control density and 
protect preferred uses. Nowhere are they given the right to impose 
a moratorium on land development which would postpone growth. 
In the dissent's view, the enabling acts should be strained to include 
a town's ingenious means of restricting growth if, and only if, clearly 
demanded by policy reasons. 
According to the dissent, the legal, economic, political, and social 
considerations which formed the basis of the Appellate Division's 
opinion should not have been so lightly brushed over. The situation 
must be viewed in terms of the continuing conflict between the evils 
of uncontrolled urban sprawl on the one hand, and the attempts of 
suburban and rural communities to avoid their natural share of 
population growth through exclusionary zoning devices on the other. 
The right of potential residents to move freely is important. The 
impact of the challenged ordinance on the region as a whole should 
also be deemed crucial. Characterizing Ramapo's stance as "par-
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ochial" the dissent noted that it would lead to economic and demo-
graphic disaster if it became the model for similarly situated, 
nearby communities. As the great majority of state legislatures have 
yet to provide for mandatory regional planning, the burden has 
fallen on the judicial system. The courts in other states had not 
shirked their duty and had "in every instance uncovered, . . . 
struck down ... [exclusionary] efforts as unconstitutional or as 
invalid under enabling acts much like those in this state."SI Accord-
ing to the dissent, Ramapo's action was in opposition to nascent 
efforts to provide regional planning and end exclusively local control 
of land use. 
The dissent does not deny that there is an urgent need to control 
the tempo and sequence of land development, and they remarked 
that various techniques are available to help effectuate that goal. 
For example, the use of minimum lot requirements, while fraught 
with danger due to their exclusionary nature, may be done validly.s2 
Similarly, the governmental purchase of "development rights" or a 
time-limited easement which compensates the landowner (but 
which still ignores the interests of potential settlers) are possibili-
ties. Another possibility would be the adoption of regional "holding 
zones" in which development is delayed, subject to agency regula-
tion, for a period limited to a short, reasonably necessary time span. 
Some methods, however, were condemned as unconstitutional be-
cause of their side-effects. For example, a plan to control growth by 
placing a moratorium on the issuance of building permits for an 
unspecified period is not valid.s3 Echoing the Pennsylvania cases, 
the dissent pointed out that avoiding the responsibilities of the fu-
ture cannot be accomplished under the guise of planning.s4 
While agreeing that the legislature is best suited to end "snob 
zoning" and provide for regional planning, the dissenting opinion 
strongly urges that the Ramapos of the state be required to solve 
their problems as best they can without infringing upon constitu-
tional rights and without an enlargement of existing zoning and 
subdivision law. Ramapo's wish to have public services precede de- . 
velopment, while landatory, is unrealistic. It is unlike the way in 
which most communities in this nation were built.85 Ramapo can-
not be allowed to decide by itself when and how to allow for popula-
tion growth, when its decision may adversely affect the whole area. SO 
B. Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County u. City of 
Petaluma 
Another manner of approaching the problem is provided in 
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Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. City of 
Petaluma,87 a recent decision of the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California. In striking down as unconstitutional 
a series of city ordinances which limited growth, the court relied 
primarily upon the fundamental right to travel.88 The City of Petal-
uma is within commuting distance of San Francisco. Although it is 
part of the Bay Area Metropolitan Region, until recently, Petaluma 
was unarguably rural. In fact, it was known for its dairy and poultry 
resources. The area's rapid expansion, however, did not pass over 
Petaluma. Although in 1962, growth was regarded as a positive de-
velopment, the city officials °began to study growth patterns. The 
number of housing units completed each year in the city rose from 
270 in 1964 to 891 in 1971, and there were strong indications at that 
time that the total would soon pass the 1000 unit figure. Estimates 
concluded that by 1985 the population would equal 77,000 and Pe-
taluma would have lost its rural character. Citing growing citizen 
concern, city officials began to seriously question their earlier judg-
ments about the desirability of growth and openly began to formu-
late plans to severely limit that trend.8• 
With the aid of professionl planners, an official development pol-
icy was adopted by the city council in June, 1971. The preamble of 
the "Petaluma Plan" unequivocally asserted: "In order to protect 
its small town character and surrounding open spaces, it shall be the 
policy of the City to control its future rate and distribution of growth 
... "'"' Two of the major methods utilized to carry out the desired 
results were ordinances limiting new housing units to 500 per year 
(at least through 1977) and the creation of an "urban extension line" 
(i.e., an ultimate boundary to mark the outer limits of the city's 
expansion for 20 or more years). In addition, the city purposefully 
limited the availability of certain municipal facilities, such as sew-
erage and water supply. Through these methods, Petaluma hoped 
that it would be able to stop growth at a proposed population of 
55,000 persons.81 
In its opinion, the district court presented a fairly detailed synop-
sis of the probable effects of this growth limitation program, espe-
cially those effects that would be likely to occur if such a policy were 
to spread to the remaining municipalities of the San Francisco met-
ropolitan region. Accepting the premise that the region is generally 
self contained and has a unitary housing market, it follows that 
persons excluded from one suburb will seek housing in other suburbs 
in the area. The suburbs which are thereby forced to absorb a larger 
share of the population growth might well be inclined to retaliate 
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by adopting exclusionary devices of their own. This proliferation 
would have several negative results. 
Limiting the housing supply would tend to keep people in the 
center cities from moving out to the suburbs.92 It would also increase 
the cost of private housing and change the rent structure of tenant 
housing. The relative decrease in supply would result in substand-
ard and obsolete housing remaining on the market, which should, 
and otherwise most likely would be replaced in a balanced market. 
Thus the overall quality of the area's housing would decline. In 
addition the mobility of current and prospective residents would be 
inhibited. These consequences were, in the court's view, particularly 
severe in the case of Petaluma since the city is a "growth center" 
for the region-an area having unused capacity which can be tapped 
or the ability to augment capacity to serve new residents. According 
to the court, it would not be feasible to force housing out of growth 
centers into either the center city or rural areas. 93 
The opinion then turns from these factual findings to its principal 
conclusion of law. A plan which leads to the exclusion of a substan-
tial number of people who would otherwise immigrate into Petal-
uma, is in violation of the fundamental right to travel guaranteed 
by the Constitution.94 Therefore Petaluma can defend its growth 
limitations if and only if they further a compelling state interest and 
are the least restrictive of all alternative solutions. 
The first "interest" offered by Petaluma-the limited sewerage 
facilities available-was held invalid, since the present facilities 
were deemed fully capable of meeting the demands of an expanding 
population. At trial, the town introduced evidence to prove that the 
growth curbs were imposed because of the insufficiency of the city's 
water and sewage treatment facilities and not to prevent immigra-
tion. In the Findings of Fact, these assertions of alleged inadequa-
cies were dismissed as excuses intended to justify the Petaluma 
Plan after its adoption.95 Furthermore, even if the facilities were 
insufficient, a less restrictive alternative would be to increase their 
capacity. The fact that this might be expensive or might necessitate 
voter approval was not determinative of the issue; a municipality 
need not choose this course, but can still be precluded from adopt-
ing another. 
Next, the city cited the limited water supply as a justification for 
its plan. This "interest" was also held invalid. The court found that 
the city had determined how much water would be needed to fulfill 
the demands of the "artificially limited" population, and then con-
tracted for only that amount. It seems obvious that a municipality 
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can not pass the "compelling interest" test by purposefully limiting 
its supply of a resource and then justifying its exclusionary zoning 
regulation by the unavailability of that resource. Again, less drastic 
alternative means could be utilized. 
The city's final argument was that a municipality has "an inher-
ent right to 'control its own rate of growth' and that its citizens' 
desires to protect their 'small town character' are sufficiently com-
pelling ... "98 Thus the ultimate issue centers around a municipal-
ity's right to accede to its residents' desires and limit growth to a 
rate well below its natural expansion rate. The court acknowledged, 
as the city pointed out, that virtually all zoning ordinances limit the 
manner in which people live and move about in some way. Further-
more, zoning authorities have traditionally been given wide latitude 
and have rarely been overturned by the judiciary.97 But these argu-
ments do not signal an end to judicial inquiry-especially where 
fundamental rights are at issue. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Edwards v. California,98 expressly 
denied to a state the right to isolate itself from present or potential 
problems by means of immigration restrictions. The logic of that 
case seems equally applicable to cities and towns within a state, 
especially if the retaliatory reaction of surrounding towns-found 
likely to occur by the court-is expanded in concentric waves to 
include the whole state. A state cannot authorize its subdivisions to 
do that which it may not do itself. While the decision prohibiting 
Petaluma from excluding potential residents is explicitly based on 
the individual's right to travel, much of the reasoning stems from 
the inequities and problems which will occur if one town is allowed 
to shift its share of the burden of population growth onto neighbor-
ing communities. The court expressly adopts the reasoning and lan-
guage employed in the series of Pennsylvania cases discussed pre-
viously in this article.DB 
After finding that the Petaluma Plan is unsupported by any com-
pelling state interests and is therefore unconstitutional, the court 
emphasized that the decision is restricted to invalidating legislation 
which is aimed at preventing immigration and growth. The court 
concluded by characterizing Petaluma's efforts as 
... anti-planning-the refusal of a city to come to grips with the fact 
that it has joined a metropolitan complex and is no longer the sleepy 
small town it once was. In a world in which nothing is as unchanging as 
change, Petaluma wants to stay the same. The means to that end is to 
draw up the bridge over the moat and turn people away. . . The pro-
spective resident turned away at Petaluma does not disappear into the 
NO-GROWTH PROVISIONS 777 
hinterland, but presents himself in some other suburb of the same me-
troplex. . . By this means, Petaluma legislates its problems into prob-
lems for Napa, Vallejo, or Walnut Creek. lOO 
The District Court opinion in Construction Industry explicitly 
declared that "the issue here has not been whether or not local 
government may engage in any number of traditional zoning efforts 
. . . such as providing for a certain density of population in a given 
neighborhood, or standards for the type and quality of construction, 
etc. The only issue presented here, for the first time, was whether 
or not a municipality may claim the specific right to keep others 
away."IOI The holding was based on two major considerations: 1) a 
town may not maintain its "small town character" by adopting a 
policy which will deprive people of their right to travel, their mobil-
ity, and their right to decent housing; and 2) no town has the right 
to shift the burden of providing housing onto other municipalities 
in a metropolitan region because it wishes to prohibit or severely 
limit growth. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decisionl02 reversing the 
lower court, largely ignored these considerations, and treated the 
case primarily as a standing problem. While voicing agreement that 
one local entity's unilateral land use decisions may affect the needs 
and resources of a much larger region, the court refused to recognize 
the right of builders and landowners of the town to challenge the 
Petaluma Plan on this ground and directed plaintiffs to seek a legis-
lative solution. The town's right to act in its own interest under the 
broadly delegated zoning power was deemed to be beyond question, 
and the effect of the Plan on surrounding towns or the municipal 
housing market was considered irrelevant. l03 Potential residents who 
will be barred may be able to bring a suit based on the right to 
travel,104 but the landowners and builders lack standing to allege a 
violation of that right. lOll 
With the dismissal of the right to travel attack, the plaintiffs were 
left with the difficult task of proving that the proposed Plan was 
arbitrary or unreasonable under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. To succeed, plaintiffs had to convince the court 
to utilize a geographically broad interpretation of the "public wel-
fare." The Court of Appeals refused to consider the general welfare 
of surrounding towns or the region as a whole. The police power, 
upon which zoning regulations are based, asserted for the health, 
safety, and welfare of the public, reaches beyond "the regulation of 
noxious activities or dangerous structures," but only within the 
municipality's limits. 100 
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Under these premises, the plaintiff's challenge was doomed. 
While noting that the probable effect of the Plan would be to ex-
clude many would-be residents, the court relied on the oft-used 
argument that "practically all zoning restrictions have as a purpose 
and effect the exclusion of some activity or type of structure or a 
certain density of inhabitants."lo7 The court then examined whether 
the Plan bore any rational relationship to a legitimate governmental 
interest. Since preservation of its small town character and rural 
attributes were deemed to be legitimate state interests which were 
obviously furthered by the zoning regulation, the Petaluma Plan 
was upheld. The court stated that it was not within its jurisdiction 
to ask if the Plan was necessary to the avowed ends; it will not 
question the wisdom of the Plan. A Due Process analysis does not 
involve the weighing of the competing interests - it merely requires 
a threshold determination of the governmental right to take the 
action in question. !Os The Court of Appeals, however, went beyond 
the traditional Due Process test to look at the degree of exclusion 
brought about by the Plan and then to judge its reasonableness. Its 
conclusions in these areas arguably are relevant to the no-growth 
issue. 
In this regard, the court views two recent cases, Village of Belle 
Terre v. Boraas l09 (hereinafter Boraas) and Ybarra v. City of Los 
Altos HillsllO (hereinafter Ybarra), as being dispositive. In the for-
mer, the United States Supreme Court rejected challenges to an 
ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwellings, declaring 
that the prohibition of multi-family dwellings was reasonable and 
within the scope of protecting the public welfare. Following Boraas, 
the Ninth Circuit upheld Los Altos Hills' one acre minimum lot 
requirement against an Equal Protection attack despite the obvious 
effect it had of restricting the access of lower classes to the town. 
The preservation of the town's rural environment was accepted as 
a sufficient interest to which the regulation was found to bear a 
rational relationship. 
After discussing the exclusions permitted in the above two cases, 
the court found that the Petaluma Plan was markedly less restric-
tive and therefore must be considered not to be arbitrary or unrea-
sonable. 1I1 The Court stressed that the Plan allowed for some growth 
-albeit well below projected free market growth-and also in-
cluded some provision for low and middle class housing so that no 
particular minority or socio-economic class would be barred.1I2 The 
Plan therefore survived the plaintiff's challenge. 
In addition to taking only a superficial look at the relationship of 
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the Plan to the defendant's governmental interests, dismissing the 
negative ramifications which the Plan will have on the metropolitan 
housing situation, and ignoring the exclusion of potential residents 
from Petaluma, the Court of Appeals overlooked crucial distinctions 
between Construction Industry on the one hand, Boraas and Ybarra 
on t~e other. First, the plaintiffs and the type of challenge they were 
asserting differed. The latter cases dealt with municipalities' at-
tempts to solve a specific problem which lead much more indirectly, 
if at all, to a no-growth situation, whereas Petaluma's explicit pur-
pose was to bar people. H3 The zoning regulations of Belle Terre and 
Los Altos Hills, while they may arguably have had the effect of 
limiting population growth, were not promulgated for that purpose. 
Belle Terre is a tiny village with total land area of approximately 
one square mile. In actuality, the ordinance under attack there was 
aimed at, and challenged for, keeping out a certain type of person. 
Belle Terre was not worried· about new construction and the attend-
ant influx of newcomers, and the case did not concern itself with 
no-growth issues. Plaintiffs in Ybarra were Mexican-Americans 
who challenged a one acre minimum lot requirement under the 
Equal Protection Clause. Unable to show racial discrimination, 
plaintiffs were forced to allege an economic classification, and were 
doomed to failure. Also, one acre is not an extremely large lot size 
in relation to those found in contemporary American suburban 
communities. At least in that light, the town's ordinance was not 
unreasonable or arbitrary. Moreover, the availability of low-cost 
housing in the neighboring communities of Santa Clara County was 
deemed relevant to the final decision. Neither of these two suits 
challenged ordinances for attempting to keep people out in general 
but rather for attempting to exclude certain people. The Petaluma 
Plan, in both purpose and effect, was markedly different from the 
Ybarra and Los Altos Hills plans, if for no other reason than the 
different place which each municipality holds in its respective 
region. 
Nowhere did the Ninth Circuit's opinion address itself to the 
problems of no growth. The decision of the New York Court of 
Appeals in Golden came to the same conclusion, ,but it addressed 
itself to Ramapo's good faith attempt to achIeve planned growth at 
a gradual pace, with particular attention to the town's specific 
problems, such as overburdening of municipal facilities and re-
sources. In reversing Construction Industry, the state of Petaluma's 
facilities and resources, which were major factors in the lower 
Court's decision, were completely ignored.H ' The two opinions -
the District Court's and the Ninth Circuit's - did not seem to 
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analyze the same aspect of the municipal plan. 1I5 The former deals 
with the Plan as an explicit method of keeping people out, while 
the latter appears to analyze the Plan as it would any traditional 
zoning device. As this article is concerned with the judicial response 
to a town's attempt to severely limit or prohibit its natural popula-
tion expansion, the District Court's opinion will be considered in the 
remainder of the article. 
C. Reconciliation and Comparison 
While the Golden and Construction Industry 116 cases reach di-
rectly opposite conclusions regarding the acceptability of restrictive 
zoning enactments, they are not necessarily incompatible. The two 
courts ask different questions and those questions go a long way 
toward predetermining the answers that are reached. Also, there are 
differences between the respective findings of fact. A majority of the 
Golden court found that Ramapo's present facilities were inade-
quate to accommodate more residents and that the proposed plan 
was a good faith attempt to cure the inadequacy. It is not clear what 
that court would have done if faced with findings of fact similar to 
those in Construction Industry, but it seems that the decision 
would have been a much harder one to reach. Similarly, it is diffi-
cult to conclude that the District Court in Construction Industry, 
if presented with findings of fact like those in Golden, would have 
found a sufficiently compelling governmental interest to save the 
Petaluma Plan. 
A major factor in Construction Industry was that Petaluma was 
guilty of "anti-planning" -the use of planning to limit services and 
exclude people rather than to accommodate them. While that deci-
sion might well have remained the same without this finding of bad 
faith, the New York opinion seems dependent to a large extent upon 
the presumption of Ramapo's good faith. The difficult determina-
tion of whether a municipality's plan was drawn to help it prepare 
for the future or whether it is an example of "anti-planning" must 
be addressed on a case-by-case basis by the court. However, such 
fact determinations are traditionally within the competence of the 
judiciary. Relevant criteria that may be utilized include the pres-
ence of a professional planner, evidence that his advice was followed 
(selective choice of his suggestions may not pass muster), evidence 
that regional side-effects were considered, an effort to get input from 
neighboring communities and statewide agencies, the absence of 
evidence showing bad faith, and perhaps inferences or presumptions 
to assist the finder of fact. 
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Another important distinction is that Ramapo's plan carefully 
avoided the explicit mention of a specific number of newcomers or 
a set number of new buildings which would be allowed each year. 
Instead, it carefully tied future development to the availability of 
future services. On the other hand, Petaluma began its plan with a 
specified maximum population and a specified number of housing 
units per year. Future services were then limited to justify these 
development figures. While the net results of the two plans may be 
quite similar, the difference in approach is not merely one of form. 
Growth can continue in Ramapo, if a private developer is willing to 
provide services. Even if private development of municipal services 
proves infeasible in Ramapo, however, there may be other means of 
accelerating the growth of facilities and thus of population. Finally, 
if Ramapo's plan is utilized to exclude people, then the court can 
always step back in.117 
Ultimately, however, the two courts are dealing with very similar 
issues. The differences between the cases seem to be less in the 
respective fact situations than in the results finally reached by each 
court. Distinguishing features appear to be relatively minor if the 
cases are viewed from a broad perspective. In each, the town govern-
ment, presumably following their citizen's desires, initiated a plan 
to severely limit future growth and used (or attempted to use) the 
finiteness of the town's facilities and resources to justify the plan 
before the court. 
IV. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO NO-GROWTH PLANS 
The prevention of urban sprawl and the preservation of open 
spaces and natural resources are best dealt with at a regional level. 118 
Political realities are such, however, that state legislatures will not 
be likely to adopt regional planning programs which would remove 
from the municipalities the power to control decisions over their 
own futures.1I9 Thus cities and towns have been left to their own 
devices. It is natural that municipal authorities will take protective 
actions and the chances are great that these actions will precipitate 
court challenges. It appears certain that the second half of the 1970's 
will see much legal confrontation over local governments' right to 
limit or prohibit population growth. 120 
As the wide divergence in result between Construction Industry 
and Golden shows, it is by no means clear how the courts will ulti-
mately decide the issue. The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the 
appeal in Golden citing the lack of a substantial federal question. 121 
Construction Industry, one of the first major decisions by a federal 
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court to deny a city the power to restrict growth, before being re-
versed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, is likely to be submit-
ted to the Supreme Court. As the issue is one of national signifi-
cance that will almost undoubtedly repeatedly arise in the future, 
it is possible that the Supreme Court will decide to hear it. 
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty CO.,122 the United States 
Supreme Court set forth the proposition that deference should be 
given to local judgments concerning proper land-use allocation. 
Until recently this rule was followed almost without exception in all 
jurisdictions. In fact, the Supreme Court has refused to even con-
sider almost all non-racial zoning cases since 1926. But even strict 
adherence to Euclid does not preclude judicial review of no-growth 
provisions. In Euclid the Court expressly did not "exclude the possi-
bility of cases where the general public interest [in overturning the 
ordinance] would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality 
[in retaining it], that the municipality would not be allowed to 
stand in the way."123 
Perhaps in conformity to that sentiment, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in a zoning case last term. Justice Douglas, writ-
ing for the majority in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,'24 upheld a 
village by-law which restricted occupancy of residences in the com-
munity to no more than two unrelated persons. His opinion sweeps 
broadly in holding that a town may "layout zones where family 
values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean 
air make this area a sanctuary for people."'25 
Because of the paucity of Supreme Court pronouncements con-
cerning zoning in recent years, as soon as Boraas was handed down, 
commentators attempted to discover its ramifications and scope.128 
While voicing dismay at the decision, opponents of exclusionary 
zoning claim that it is not particularly significant to the no-growth 
dilemma. Boraas is distinguishable on two major grounds. First the 
ordinance under attack in that case did not attempt to limit or even 
to slow down growth. And more importantly, the Court specifically 
found that there was no infringement upon fundamental personal 
rights '27 nor upon the welfare of the general public. '28 Thus, the 
Court employed the more lenient "rational relationship" test in 
upholding the ordinance in the face of an Equal Protection chal-
lenge. '29 Therefore, it remains unclear what the Court will do when 
faced with a zoning ordinance which is not deemed so benign. '30 
While Justice Douglas's opinion, however, fails to grapple with 
the difficult underlying questions of no-growth enactments, the 
thrust of the decision seems clear: local land-use and zoning deci-
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sions will continue to be given great deference by the Supreme 
Court. While Boraas itself may be distinguishable, there is little 
reason to believe that the Supreme Court is ready to strike down 
zoning enactments. And even if some ordinances are found which 
are so clearly aimed at excluding peoplel31 that the Supreme Court 
is forced to strike them down, localities will still be able to evade 
the problem by adopting a Ramapo-type plan. 132 
Exclusionary zoning has been defined as "the complex of zoning 
practices which result in denying suburban housing and land mar-
kets to low and moderate income families."133 No-growth limitations 
are just one form of exclusionary zoning practice. Except for the 
right to travel, no-growth provisions do not seem to infringe upon 
constitutional rights any more than other exclusionary zoning de-
vices. Thus, if a challenge to no-growth provisions does not prevail 
on that ground, it is unlikely that it will prevail at all, unless the 
Supreme Court dramatically departs from its prior line of decisions. 
While several years ago there may have been reason to believe 
that the right to travel could be utilized to strike down no-growth 
provisions, that is no longer true today. With the decision in Shapiro 
v. Thompson,134 invalidating a one year residency requirement for 
welfare recipients, the Supreme Court reached the high-water mark 
of that right's applicability. Two years later, in James v. Valtierra,135 
a challenge to a California constitutional amendment which permit-
ted communities to exclude low-income housing projects was re-
buffed. While the right to travel was not mentioned in the opinion, 
it would seem to have been highly relevantl38 and its non-use worthy 
of note. It should also be noted that the racial discrimination which 
many feel underlay the James case would have made it much easier 
for the Court to find for the plaintiff there, than in a non-racial no-
growth case. 134 The right to travel is not a new weapon in the consti-
tutional arsenal. There seems to be no indication, however, that the 
Burger Court will use it-or any other device-to attack zoning 
ordinances, unless perhaps those ordinances are particularly fla-
grant. 13S Thus future challenges to no-growth provisions will most 
likely be contested in the state courtS. 13D 
Judicial hesitancy to take the forefront in an area which seems to 
be better suited to legislative decision-making is understandable. 
But due to the self-imposed shackelling of most state legislatures, 
the courts will often find themselves in a situation where they are 
the only available arbiters. No-growth provisions potentially have 
a great impact on landowners, would-be residents, and neighboring 
communities. But the problems which lead to the enactment of no-
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growth restrictions often pose very real and crucial difficulties for 
communities which will only be exacerbated by delay. As popula-
tion growth and expansion away from the center cities continues, it 
will become even more important that the courts not shirk this 
responsibility. 
Both the nature of the controversy and the balancing of compet-
ing interests that its solution demands are well within the judici-
ary's zone of competence. To be as effective as possible, the courts 
should articulate standards to avoid having to deal piece-meal with 
each case as it arises. Furthermore, the development of an approach 
to confront these issues would provide guidance to local zoning 
authorities. 14o In addition to the constitutional rights of landowners 
and potential residents and the needs of municipalities to protect 
themselves from the multitude of problems brought by growth, 
there is another consideration which should be added to the bal-
ance. Many commentators feel that sooner or later some sort of 
regional planning will be adopted in most states. Until then, how-
ever, steps should be taken to prevent cities and towns from enact-
ing ordinances which will hinder the eventual adoption of a more 
rational scheme.141 
At least one state, while not yet ready to enact compulsory re-
gional planning, has recognized the importance of being able to veto 
some restrictive local zoning enactments. In this respect, Massachu-
setts' anti-snob zoning law142 is a compromise measure. It sets up a 
state-wide Board of Zoning Appeals to hear challenges to municipal 
zoning enactments which have negative effects on the general wel-
fare of the region or hinder further regional planning decisions. In 
addition to overseeing restrictive zoning laws, such a board could be 
empowered to veto a local zoning decision which allows construction 
that is deemed to have a detrimental impact on the regional envi-
ronment. 
Whether the competing interests are weighed by an administra-
tive agency or by the courts, the results should be the same. The 
important thing is that the standards be articulated. On the other 
hand, one of the positive attributes of judicial intervention is the 
potential for flexibility, and therefore strict guidelines should be 
avoided. But it is possible to note several of the factors to be weighed 
in assessing the validity of a no-growth plan without tying the 
courts' hands or prejudging the result.143 
Any balancing test must look at the applicable legislative enact-
ments, the problems they attempt to confront, their effectiveness in 
terms of solving those problems, alternative solutions, as well as the 
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individual rights that are infringed-the degree of infringement and 
the fundamentality of those rights.144 One central concern should be 
the general welfare of the overall community. If local interests con-
flict with it, the locality must yield. 145 Therefore the first factor to 
be put into the balance is the effect of the plan on the region 
(weighed both by severity and likelihood). Demographic studies to 
show the current density and estimated future population figures 
are essential at both the municipal and regional levels. Also, the 
reason for the increased immigration may be relevant. If the new-
comers are building second homes (as in Sanbornton) the munici-
pality should be granted greater leeway. The problems which led to 
the municipality's adoption of the no-growth plan must be carefully 
examined and analyzed. The imminence, severity, and long-term 
effects of these problems may also be crucial factors. The quality 
and quantity of any resource or service shortage must be scruti-
nized. While a court may not be able to order a town to build or 
enlarge a facility or sign a contract, it can forbid the town from 
dealing with its problems by limiting population. The practicality 
of the plan and the alternatives must be examined to see how well 
they solve the problem. Also relevant is the impact of the plan on 
individuals including residents, landowners, and potential resi-
dents. One suggestion for accomplishing these goals might be for the 
court to request each party to draw up a regional "impact state-
ment" which would include all relevant data regarding the plan and 
its side-effects. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to look at one form of municipal ac-
tion, which is likely to become more popular in the near future, and 
provide a framework for judging it in relation to the public welfare. 
While Ramapo-type plans, tying development to the availability of 
services, should not be permitted to serve as a clever means of by-
passing real judicial scrutiny,146 the expanding pressures of popula-
tion growth must be controlled and the nation's environment and 
natural resources protected to the greatest extent possible. 
Presently exclusionary zoning devices are regarded basically as 
environmentally oriented. But insofar as they further a piece-meal 
approach to land use decision making and the allocation of re-
sources, they may, in the long run, hinder effective efforts to bring 
about environmental protection. Cities and towns cannot ultimately 
solve their problems by pushing them off upon neighboring com-
munities. 
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Numerous writers in this area have cited the necessity for legisla-
tive action to enable cities and towns to plan for the future in a 
rational, coordinated and effective manner. To be effective, regional 
planning boards must be able to exercise real power. But it may be 
many years before states are ready and able to accept that premise 
and act upon it. Judicial action to control the proliferation of no-
growth programs in the interim may be of extreme importance, 
because the taking of definitive steps by the legislature may well be 
postponed until a crisis situation is already underway. 
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I "No-growth" provisions refer to an enactment or set of enact-
ments promulgated by a municipality to prohibit population expan-
sion above a specific numerical figure by controlling either the rate 
or timing of growth or both. The plans adopted by Ramapo, Petal-
uma, Sanbornton, and other towns discussed herein vary somewhat 
in technique, but all restrict their community's "natural" expansion 
rates. In addition to zoning ordinances, no-growth programs may 
take other forms such as limitation on the availability of building 
permits. A distinction is to be drawn between no-growth provisions 
and more traditional exclusionary devices such as large lot zoning, 
restrictions against multiple dwellings, and floor space, frontage, or 
density requirements. While these methods may be less direct than 
no-growth provisions, their practical effects may be as all encom-
passing as the latter technique. For example, requiring a 4 acre lot 
in a small town of 20,000 acres can keep the growth level down to 
the same extent as a prohibition of building more than 5000 houses 
without special permit. Here the difference would be little more 
than semantical, but usually a no-growth plan does substantially 
differ, both in tone and result, from the "traditional" devices. 
2 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 
(1926). 
3 This was true even in the heyday of substantive Due Process 
when the Supreme Court was much more willing to substitute its 
wisdom for that of a legislative body. The last time the Court found 
for a plaintiff in a zoning challenge was in Nectow v. City of Cam-
bridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
4 While no-growth provisions may be challenged by landowners 
who are prohibited from subdividing their tracts, both excluded 
would-be immigrants and the residents of surrounding communities 
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lack the property interest necessary to a Due Process challenge. 
Thus, unless a suit alleging some deprivation of liberty could be 
fashioned-which is unlikely-the use of the Due Process clause has 
inherent disadvantages for no-growth provisions. 
5 The standing question in this area is extremely interesting. 
Some of its aspects are discussed in Sager, Tight Little Islands: 
Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. 
L. REV. 767, 784 (1969). See also Note, The Responsibility of Local 
Zoning Authorities to Nonresident Indigents, 23 STAN. L. REV. 774 
(1971). 
Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct. 2196 (1975), denied several plaintiffs 
standing to challenge a zoning ordinance which effectively prohib-
ited the construction of low-income housing within a municipality. 
Landowners, potential builders, and minority-group potential resi-
dents were found to lack the requisite injury in fact to support an 
Equal Protection attack. The (5-4) decision treated each plaintiff 
separately. The potential residents failed to allege facts to support 
an actionable causal relationship between the zoning practices and 
their alleged injury. To obtain standing, a plaintiff must allege spe-
cific, concrete facts demonstrating that such practices harm him or 
her individually and that he or she would personally benefit in a 
tangible way from judicial intervention, i. e., if it were not for the 
zoning restrictions there is a substantial probability that plaintiff 
would have been able to reside in the town. The Court overlooked 
that the past history of barring projects under the zoning practices 
in question was primarily responsible for the lack of a current con-
crete building proposal, and distinguished prior cases in which 
standing had been found to exist on the ground that they chal-
lenged zoning restrictions as applied to particular projects for which 
plaintiffs would have been eligible. A specific plan to focus on the 
particular municipality may be enough to give a builder-plaintiff 
standing if administrative remedies have been first exhausted. 
While the opinion does not close the door on all suits by potential 
residents, it does indicate the tenor of the Court's view and places 
definite stumbling blocks in plaintiff's path. 
6 For a greatly expanded discussion of the new equal protection 
test, see Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 
HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1087-1132 (1969). 
7 At this time, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the follow-
ing "suspect classifications": race - Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 
10 (1967); national origin - Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944); 
and perhaps, legitimacy - Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
788 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
Also, four of the nine justices would have added sex to the list in 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
8 The only "fundamental rights" recognized by the Court are: 
voting - Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); 
interstate travel - Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); fair trial 
and appeal - Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1968); criminal 
procedure - Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 535 (1942). 
9 Indigency, which many believe is beyond a person's control like 
the other suspect classifications, has not been elevated to that sta-
tus. See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) 
and James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). Cf. Warth v. Seldin, 
95 S.Ct. 2196 (1975). 
10 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing is not a 
fundamental right); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1 (1973) (education is not afundamental right); Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (welfare payments are not fundamen-
tal for equal protection purposes). 
11 See Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. 
Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970). Therein the 9th Circuit 
declared that the city could not institute land-use planning to im-
prove the quality of life of only some of its citizens. But note that 
Union City was decided before the above-mentioned Supreme Court 
cases which seem to drastically undermine it. See Note, supra note 
5, at 790-92. 
12 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
13 See Cole v. Housing Authority of the City of Newport, 435 F.2d 
807 (1st Cir. 1970) and King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing 
Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 
(local residency requirements for admission into a federally assisted 
housing project declared unconstitutional). 
14 See Comment, The Right to Travel: Another Constitutional 
Standard for Local Land Use Regulations? 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 612 
(1972). 
15 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
15.1 But see, Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2196 (1975). 
18 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972). 
17 313 Ky. 265, 230 S.W.2d 902 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 945 
(1951). 
18 See, e.g., Cadoux v. Planning and Zoning Commission of the 
Town of Weston, 162 Conn. 425", 294 A.2d 583 (1972), cert. denied, 
408 U.S. 924 (1972); Blank v. Town of Lake Clarke Shores, 161 So.2d 
683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); McDermott v. Village of Calverton 
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Park, 454 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1970); and Valley View Village, Inc. v. 
Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955). 
19 Appeal of Girsch, 437 Pa. 237, 245-46, 263 A.2d 398,399 (1970). 
20 Often these are explicitly linked. See Connor v. Township of 
Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 211, 81 N.W.2d 789, 795 (1959). 
21 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 
(1926). 
22 Nicholson v. Connecticut Half-way House, Inc., 153 Conn. 507, 
218 A.2d 383 (1966). The above case, a nuisance case, presents a 
situation where an individual is denied compensation or an injunc-
tion in his efforts to resist the placing of a resource deemed to be 
important to the welfare of his town. An analagous situation exists 
where a town is prohibited from taking action which may increase 
(or at least resist diminution of) the property values of its residents' 
property because of considerations going to the welfare of the sur-
rounding region. 
23 See, e.g., Gignoux v. Village of Kings Point, 199 Misc. 485,491, 
99 N.Y.S.2d 280, 286 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Town of Lexington v. Gov-
enar, 295 Mass. 31, 36-37, 3 N.E.2d 19, 22 (1936). 
24 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 3 (1975). 
25 See Note, Zoning for Aesthetics-A Problem of Definition, 32 
U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 377 (1963). 
28 See generally Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1968) and cases cited 
therein. 
27 See, e.g., Barney and Carey Co. v. Town of Milton, 324 Mass. 
440, 448, 87 N .E.2d 9, 14 (1949); Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 
773, 778, 128 N.E.2d 557, 561 (1955). 
28 Standard Oil Co. v. City of Bowling Green, 244 Ky. 362, 50 
S.W.2d 960 (1932). 
29 City of Norris v. Bradford, 204 Tenn. 319, 321 S.W.2d 543 
(1958). 
30 Stoner McCray System v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 
78 N.W.2d 843 (1956). 
31 Hitchman v. Township of Oakland, 329 Mich. 331, 45 N.W.2d 
306 (1951). 
32 Romar Realty Co. v. Bd. of Commissioners of Haddonfield, 96 
N.J.L. 117, 120, 114 A. 248, 250 (1921). 
33 City of Youngstown v. Kahn Brothers Building Co., 112 Ohio 
St. 654, 661-62, 148 N.E. 842, 844 (1925). 
34 See State ex rel. American Oil Co. v. Bessent, 27 Wis.2d 537, 
135 N.W.2d 317 (1965); and People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 240 
N.Y.S.2d 734, 191 N.E.2d 272, appeal dism'd 375 U.S. 42 (1963). 
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35 See, e.g., Confederacion de la Raza Unida v. City of Morgan 
Hill, 324 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Cal. 1971) where a restriction on the 
development of a particularly charming area of a city was permitted 
because of aesthetic and environmental concerns. See also County 
Commissioners of Queen Anne's County v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 
A.2d 450 (1967) which upheld a 5 acre minimum lot requirement 
pursuant to a long range plan to preserve an unusually beautiful 
county estate section along a river. 
38 24 Misc. 2d 366, 198 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1960). 
37 See, e.g., Gruber v. Mayor and Township Committee of Raritan 
Tp., 39 N.J. 1, 186 A.2d 489 (1962) where an ordinance which re-
zoned to encourage new industry in order to alleviate a heavy tax 
burden was upheld. 
38 Ct., e.g., Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 
1970); and Kennedy Park Homes Assn. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 
F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970). 
39 114 Ill. App. 2d 267, 252 N.E.2d 765 (1969). 
40 Id. at 278, 252 N.E.2d at 770. 
41 First National Bank of Skokie v. Village of Skokie, 85 Ill. App. 
2d 326, 339, 229 N.E.2d 378, 385 (1967). 
42 See, e.g.,' Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 
117 N.J. Super. 11, 18, 283 A.2d 353, 357 (1971). 
43 The following cases are representative of the Pennsylvania line: 
(a) Bilbar Construction Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjust-
ment, 339 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958) upholding a one acre mini-
mum lot requirement. 
(b) National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 
A.2d 597 (1965) striking down a 4 acre minimum lot requirement as 
clearly unreasonable and explicitly rejecting the aesthetic argu-
ment. 
(c) Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. v. Township of Concord, 439 Pa. 466, 
268 A.2d 765, 48 A.L.R.3d 1190 (1970), striking down 2 and 3 acre 
minimum lot requirements enacted to avoid potential sewerage 
problem. 
(d) Appeal of Girsch, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 315 (1970) declaring 
an ordinance unconstitutional for failure to provide for apartment 
uses. 
Where a municipality is a logical place for development to take 
place, it may not, via zoning, refuse to bear its rightful part of the 
burden of population growth. 
44 Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. v. Township of Concord, 439 Pa. 466, 
472 n.5, 268 A.2d 765, 767 n.5 (1970). 
45 Id. at 474, 268 A.2d at 768. In addition to basing its conclusion 
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on the due process rights of the landowner whose property had been 
adversely zoned, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explicitly ac-
knowledged "the rights of other people desirous of moving into the 
area in search of a comfortable place to live" and cites the article 
by Sager, note 5 supra. 
48 National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 528, 
215 A.2d 597, 610 (1965). 
47 This interest differs subtly from a moratorium to allow a town-
ship to "catch its breath." See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Town-
ship of Madison, 117 N.J. Super, 11, 14, 283 A.2d 353, 355 (1971). 
48 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972). 
49 Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 338 
F.Supp. 301 (D.N.H. 1972). 
50 Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 
956, 960 (1st Cir. 1972). 
51 Id. at 961. 
52 Id. at 962. ". . . [I]n effect the town has bought time for its 
citizens not unlike the time taken in referendum by the city of 
Boulder, Colorado to restrict growth on an emergency basis until an 
adequate study can be made of future needs. 60 Georgetown Law 
Journal 1363 (1972)." 
53 Several different definitions exist for the term "comprehensive 
plan." For the purpose of this article, it will refer to a detailed 
scheme devised by professional planners to control and direct the 
use and development of a municipality's property. Other definitions 
found in 40 A.L.R3d 372 include: a) "an integrated product of a 
rational process revealing a physical partition of the municipality, 
reasonably designed to produce a homogeneous pattern of location 
and uniform development of variant land uses." Ward v. Montgo-
mery Tp., 28 N.J. 529, 147 A.2d 248 (1959); b) a general plan to 
control and direct the use and development of property in a munici-
pality into districts according to the present and potential uses of 
the property. Bishop v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 133 Conn. 614, 53 
A.2d 659 (1947); c) a scheme or formula of zoning that reasonably 
relates the regulation and restriction of land uses and the establish-
ment of land uses therefor to the health, safety, and welfare of the 
public. Hadley v. Harold Realty Co., 97 RI. 403, 198 A.2d 149, 
rearg. denied 97 RI. 413, 199 A.2d 121 (1964). See generally Annot., 
40 A.L.R.3d 372 (1971). See also Haar, "In Accordance with a 
Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955) and Note, 
Comprehensive Land Use Plans and the Consistency Requirement, 
2 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 765 (1974). 
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54 8 Misc.2d 255, 167 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sup. Ct. 1957). 
55 Id. at 257, 167 N.Y.S.2d at 844-45. 
56 N.Y. TOWN LAWS § 263 (McKinney 1965). 
57 National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 528, 
215 A.2d 597, 610 (1965). 
58 117 N.J. Super 11, 283 A.2d 353 (1971). 
59 Id. These typical facts included population growth from 7366 
in 1950 to 48,715 in 1970 while a professional planner testified that 
the township potentially could hold 200,000 people. Madison wished 
to restrict its growth to less than 200 two-bedroom units per year up 
to a total of 700 new units and wanted to keep 30% of its land 
vacant. 
60 See Binkowski v. Township of Shelby, 46 Mich. App. 451, 208 
N.W.2d 243 (1973); cf. National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn, 
419 Pa. 504, 532, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965). 
61 30 N.Y.2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291, appeal 
dism'd 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Golden). 
62 Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 37 App. Div. 2d 236, 324 
N.Y.S.2d 178 (1971) and a companion case, Rockland County 
Builders Assn. v. Town Bd. of Ramapo, 37 App. Div. 2d 738, 324 
N.Y.S.2d 190(1971) were combined by the Court of Appeals. 
63 Concurring opinion of Appellate Division Justice Hopkins, 37 
App. Div. 2d at 244-46,324 N.Y.S.2d at 187-89 noted in the dissent-
ing opinion ofthe Court of Appeals, 30 N.Y.2d at 391,334 N.Y.S.2d 
at 163, 285 N .E.2d at 309. 
64 Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 366 n.1, 334 
N.Y.S.2d at 142, 285 N.E.2d at 294. 
65 See note 43 supra. 
66 Golden v. PlanningBd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 369, 334 
N.Y.S.2d at 144,285 N.E.2d at 296. 
67 Id. at 367, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143, 285 N.E.2d at 295. 
68 See N.Y. TOWN LAWS §§ 261 and 263 (McKinney 1965), as set 
out in Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 387-88,334 
N.Y.S.2d at 159, 285 N.E.2d at 307. 
69 Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 37 App. Div. 2d 236, 244-
45,324 N.Y.S.2d 178, 187 (1972). 
70 Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 373 n.7, 334 
N.Y.S.2d at 148, 285 N.E.2d at 299. 
71 Id. at 374, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 148, 285 N.E.2d at 299. 
72 See Note, Snob Zoning: Developments in Massachusetts and 
New Jersey, 7 HARV. J. LEGIS. 246, 258-59 (1970). MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 40B§ 20-23 (1973), WIse. ST. ANN. § 144.025 (1974). For a discus-
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sion of Vermont's experience see McClaughrey, The Land Use Plan-
ning Act-An Idea We Can Do Without, 3 ENV. AFF. 595, 600-605 
(1975). 
73 N.Y. GEN. MUNICIPAL LAW § 239-1m (McKinney 1974). Also see 
Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 375, n.8, 334 
N.Y.S.2d at 149, 285 N.E.2d at 229-300. 
74 Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 375-76, 334 
N.Y.S.2d at 150, 285 N.E.2d at 300. 
75 ld. at 371-72, n.6, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 146-47, 285 N.E.2d at 297. 
78 ld. at 376, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150, 285 N.E.2d at 300. 
77 ld. at 378, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152, 285 N.E.2d 301. See also Na-
tional Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504,528,215 A.2d 
297, 610 (1965). 
78 Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 378, 334 
N.Y.2d at 152, 285 N.E.2d at 302. 
79 The dissent distinguishes Golden from the Pennsylvania cases 
which are discussed at note 43 supra. 
80 Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 380, 334 
N.Y.S.2d at 153, 285 N.E.2d at 303. 
81 ld. at 385, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 158, 285 N.E.2d at 306 (dissenting 
opinion) citing National Land and Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 410 Pa. 504, 
215 A.2d 597 (1965); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of 
Madison, 119 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (1971); Lakeland Bluff, 
Inc. v. County of Will, 114 Ill. App. 2d 267, 252 N.E.2d 765 (1969); 
Appeal of Girsch, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 398 (1970); and Bristow v. 
City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205,192 N.W.2d 322 (1971). 
82 See Josephs v. Town Bd. of Clarkstown, 24 Misc. 2d 366, 198 
N.Y.S.2d 695 (1960). 
83 See Albrecht Realty Co. v. Township of New Castle, 8 Misc.2d 
255, 167 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1957). 
84 See note 43 supra. 
85 The dissent's historical argument has obvious weaknesses. 
Merely because mistakes were made in the past is no justification 
for repeating them in the future. In fact, the very purpose of histori-
cal analysis is to allow people to learn from past mistakes. 
88 See Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind 
the Rights of the Whole World, 1 FLA. ST. L. REV. 234 (1973). 
87 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (hereinafter cited as Con-
struction Industry). 
88 ld. at 581-82. The court expressly dismissed the standing ques-
tion. Quoting from Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 
U.S. 250, 257 (1974), "Shapiro [v. Thompson] did not rest upon a 
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finding that denial of welfare actually deterred travel. Nor have 
other 'right to travel' cases in this Court always relied on the pres-
ence of actual deterrence." But see Warth v. Seldin, 95 Sup.Ct. 2196 
(1975); Construction Industry Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, No. 74-
2100 (9th Cir., Aug. 13, 1975). 
89 Construction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of 
Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 575-76 (N.D. Cal. 1974). Findings of 
Fact 1-6. 
90 [d. at 576. The "Official Statement of Developmental Policy for 
the City of Petaluma" as found in Finding of Fact 7. 
91 [d. at 576. Finding of Fact 9(b). 
92 [d. at 579. Finding of Fact 14(d). The racial ramifications of 
this point were not explored in the decision and will not be specifi-
cally confronted in this article. Also the discrimination against the 
poor that would be likely to follow from the plan was not examined 
by the court. 
93 [d. at 480. Finding of Fact 14(j) and (k). 
94 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Edwards v. Califor-
nia, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). See notes 12-14 supra. 
95 Construction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Pe-
taluma, 375 F. Supp. at 578. The city did not establish that any of 
its facilities were in any way threatened by the projected residential 
growth. The court found that Petaluma 
faced no immediate, serious, or unusual difficulty in using or expand-
ing the capacity of its public facilities to serve existing demographic and 
market growth rates in housing. The city could have continued to meet 
the demands on such facilities made by the anticipated growth rate 
trends without unusual strain via facilities now in place, under construc-
tion, or capable of being augmented by new capacity. 
The court's opinion included specific findings of fact on the sewer-
age and water facilities which substantiated the above conclusion. 
Finding of Fact 13(e) and (k). 
98 [d. at 585. 
97 This basic premise, articulated in Euclid, discussed in text 
accompanying note 107 intra, and accepted throughout the country, 
is being re-examined in a growing number of courts in the nation's 
most important states. While still accepted by only a small minor-
ity, the trend seems to have great potential. 
98 314 U.S. 160, 173-74 (1941). As Mr. Justice Cardozo said, "The 
Constitution was framed. . . upon the theory that the people of the 
several states must sink or swim together ... " As quoted in Con-
struction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 
375 F. Supp. at 584. 
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99 Construction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of 
Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. at 585-86, quoting from National Land 
and Investment Co. v. Kohn, Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. v. Township 
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